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I Introduction: the Phillips curve and macroeconomics 
 
  The Philips curve is a central component of macroeconomics, providing a 
structural equation that determines the rate of inflation as a function of the rate of 
unemployment. It is also central for policymaking since it constitutes a basic constraint 
on policy. If policymakers choose to stimulate economic activity, ultimate outcomes are 
constrained to lie on the Phillips curve which determines the set of sustainable inflation – 
unemployment outcomes. There is no lasting unemployment - inflation trade-off if the 
long-run Phillips curve is vertical. 
  This paper examines the theory of the Phillips curve theory, focusing on the 
critical distinction between “formation” of inflation expectations and “incorporation” of 
inflation expectations. Phillips curve theory has historically focused on the former and 
neglected the latter. That has had profound and little appreciated implications for Phillips 
curve theory and macroeconomics. 
2 
   The critical juncture in this history was the Friedman (1968) – Phelps (1968) 
reformulation of Phillips curve theory in the late 1960s. That reformulation shifted the 
focus of Phillips curve research to the issue of expectation formation, closing an 
alternative research program suggested by Tobin (1971a, 1971b) that focused on 
incorporation of inflation expectations.  
  Tobin’s alternative program was abandoned because it is logically incompatible 
with macro models that have a single aggregate labor market, and instead requires 
adoption of multi-sector labor markets. This gave the Friedman – Phelps approach a 
strategic advantage since it was compatible with single good – single labor market macro 
models that macroeconomists are familiar with and which are also easier to use.  
  Explaining the Phillips curve by reference to expectation formation dramatically 
twists the economic welfare and policy implications of Phillips curve theory. As long as 
the Phillips curve is explained by reference to formation of inflation expectations, it will 
remain in the orbit of natural rate thinking where there is no welfare justification for 
monetary policy aimed at reducing unemployment. In contrast, explaining the Phillips 
curve by reference to incorporation of inflation expectations breaks that orbit and 
provides a welfare economics rationale for Keynesian activist policies that reduce 
unemployment at the cost of higher inflation. 
II The original Phillips curve: the Phillips-Lipsey nominal wage model 
  The history of the Phillips curve begins with Phillips’ (1958) seminal paper that 
reported a negative relation in the United Kingdom between the rate of nominal wage 
change and the unemployment rate over the period 1861 and 1957. Phillips’ finding was 
quickly incorporated into macroeconomics as if it were a theoretically founded relation. 
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 In this regard, an article by Samuelson and Solow (1960) was especially influential, as it 
suggested how the Phillips curve might be relevant for anti-inflation policy. Since 
provision of policy guidance has always been an important motivation behind Keynesian 
structural macroeconomic modeling, this provided an impetus for incorporating the 
Phillips curve in macro models.  
  Though quickly incorporated into theoretical macroeconomics, the Phillips curve 
was actually an empirical finding. That means it has always needed a theoretical 
explanation.
1 Lipsey (1960) offered a first theoretical explanation, arguing the Phillips 
curve reflected a process of gradual disequilibrium adjustment in a conventional 
aggregate labor market. That process was described as follows: 
 (1.1) w = f(u – u
*)                   f(0) = 0, f
’ < 0, f
”< 0 
 where w = nominal wage inflation; u = actual unemployment rate; and u
*= rate of 
unemployment (frictional and structural) associated with full employment. According to 
the Lipsey model, conditions of excess labor demand cause nominal wage inflation, while 
conditions of excess labor supply cause nominal wage deflation. 
  Lipsey’s (1960) theoretical formulation of the Phillips curve was quickly adopted, 
but almost immediately the empirical Phillips curve began to display instability, shifting 
up in unemployment rate – inflation space. This shift prompted search for a theoretical 
repair, and that repair ended up fundamentally transforming macroeconomics and shifting 
it in a direction that still holds. 
IV The Friedman – Phelps Phillips curve: adaptive expectations in an aggregate 
neo-classical labor market 
                                                 
1 Tobin (1972, re-printed 1975, p.45) has a lovely description of the Phillips curve as “an 
empirical finding in search of a theory, like Pirandello characters in search of an author.” 
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   The theoretical repair and transformation of the Phillips curve involved two steps. 
Step one was the recognition that labor markets determine real wages. Consequently, if 
the Phillips curve is the product of imbalance between labor supply and demand, it 
should determine real wage inflation. That implies a Phillips curve of the form
2  
(2.1) ω = f(u – u
*)                   f(0) = 0, f
’ < 0, f
” < 0 
ω = real wage inflation. Defining real wage inflation as 
(2.2) ω = w – π 
π = rate of price inflation. Substituting equation (2.2) into equation (2.1) then implies the 
Phillips curve should take the form  
(2.3) w = f(u – u
*) + π 
  Step two was Friedman (1968) and Phelps’ (1968) incorporation of inflation 
expectations into the nominal wage adjustment process, so that the Phillips curve 
becomes 




e = expected inflation. Assuming labor is the only cost of production and there is no 
productivity growth, actual inflation is then given by 
(2.5) π = w 
Substituting (2.5) into (2.4) then yields a Friedman – Phelps price inflation Phillips curve 
given by 
(2.6) π = f(u – u
*) + π
e 
This formulation places inflation expectations center stage and it has essentially set the 
course of Phillips curve research for the past forty years. 
                                                 
2 If there is labor productivity growth real wages should grow at the rate of productivity growth. 
That implies adding a constant term to equation (2.1). For simplicity, the issue of productivity 
growth is abstracted from throughout the paper. 
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     There are three major analytical implications from this simple framework. First, 
the long run Phillips curve is vertical because the long run equilibrium rate of 
unemployment is determined by labor supply and demand, which is independent of 
inflation. Long-run equilibrium requires inflation expectations are fulfilled so that 
(2.7)  π = π
e 
Substituting (2.7) into (2.6) then implies f(u – u
*) = 0 so that u = u
*. In the long run the 
economy settles at the full employment rate of unemployment, which Friedman (1968) 
termed the natural rate of unemployment. Natural unemployment consists of frictional 
and structural unemployment and is independent of the inflation rate. Consequently, the 
long run Phillips curve is vertical because the natural rate is independent of inflation and 
therefore consistent with any equilibrium rate of inflation. 
  This argument against a trade-off is fully consistent with neo-classical theory, 
according to which labor markets determine real wages and employment through the 
interaction of labor demand and supply. Since neither labor demand (the marginal 
product of labor) nor labor supply (the monetary value of the marginal disutility of labor) 
are affected by inflation, employment and unemployment are also unaffected by inflation. 
Ergo, there can be no permanent equilibrium trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment.  
  Second, though there is no long-run trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment, there can be a short-run trade-off if inflation expectations are adaptive 
and formed with a lag. Consequently, faster nominal aggregate demand growth is not 
immediately neutralized by a jump in inflation expectations. 
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    By stimulating nominal aggregate demand, policy makers can immediately lower 
unemployment because inflation expectations are initially pre-determined by the adaptive 
mechanism. This causes a movement along the initial short-run Phillips curve. However, 
thereafter inflation expectations start to increase, causing the economy to shift to a higher 
short-run Phillips curve and eventually track back to a new point on the long-run Phillips 
curve where expected inflation again equals (higher) actual inflation.  
  Third, though the Friedman – Phelps model allows no permanent trade-off along a 
given short-run Phillips curve, policy can still lower unemployment permanently if 
policymakers are willing to persistently accelerate inflation. In this event, policymakers 
keep accelerating nominal demand growth and staying one step ahead of workers’ 
inflation expectations which are formed adaptively. In effect, policymakers have the 
economy moving upward along the family of short-run Phillips curves. By accelerating 
nominal demand growth, policymakers can ensure that actual inflation always exceeds 
expected inflation, thereby keeping labor markets away from the natural rate of 
unemployment. 
V The Lucas Phillips curve: rational expectations in an aggregate neo-classical labor 
market 
  The Friedman – Phelps reformulation of the Phillips curve introduced inflation 
expectations and placed formation of inflation expectations center stage. Lucas (1972, 
1973) cemented the new research focus on expectation formation by replacing adaptive 
expectations with rational expectations, and this further diminished the claims regarding 
existence of an inflation–unemployment policy trade-off.  
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   With rational expectations the long-run Phillips curve remains vertical, but there 
is no longer a family of short-run Phillips curves for the monetary authority to openly 
exploit. And nor can the monetary authority accelerate inflation to keep unemployment 
down.
3 Instead, deviations from the natural rate can only come as a result of surprise 
shocks and policy can do nothing to systematically move economic outcomes below the 
natural rate.
4  
  The Friedman – Phelps – Lucas synthesis has had an enormous transformative 
impact on macroeconomics and that impact remains present. First, the triumph of the 
vertical long run Phillips curve did away with the prior Keynesian discourse about full 
employment and full employment policy. Instead, full employment was replaced by the 
natural rate of unemployment and full employment policy was replaced by 
microeconomic labor market flexibility policy aimed at lowering the natural rate by 
weakening unions and worker protections. 
  Second, Lucas’ introduction of rational expectations shifted the attention of 
economics to the implications of expectation formation for policy. Rational expectations 
require agents understand what policy is doing, which leads to analyzing policy in terms 
of “systematic rules”.  That reframes policy in terms of establishing an optimal policy 
rule. To be effective the rule must be believed by the public, which leads to the problems 
of time consistency of policy (Kydland and Prescott, 1977) and policy credibility. That 
                                                 
3 In a non-stochastic rational expectations model agents have perfect foresight and the economy is 
always on the long-run Phillips and there are no short-run Phillips curves. In a stochastic model 
the monetary authority can engage in surprise monetary expansions that lower the unemployment 
rate and raise inflation, but those surprises cannot be systematically repeated as agents will learn to 
anticipate them. 
4 The only policy that is effective is random policy that pushes the unemployment rate above and 
below the natural rate with equal probability. However, that increases economic volatility, which 
is welfare reducing. The best that policy can do is to offset shocks and reduce the variability of 
fluctuations around the natural rate. 
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 then leads to issues such as central bank reputation and central bank independence (Barro 
and Gordon, 1983a).   
  Third, the Friedman – Phelps – Lucas synthesis fundamentally transforms the 
economic welfare interpretation of using macroeconomic policy to lower unemployment. 
According to natural rate theory deviations from the natural rate are an economic 
distortion that lowers economic welfare. This follows from neo-classical labor market 
theory that represents the economy as achieving best feasible employment outcomes 
given tastes, technology, and the distribution of endowments. In such a world monetary 
policy can only lower unemployment by “fooling” workers about expected inflation, 
which reduces workers’ welfare. That is a dramatically different view from the 
Keynesian view embodied in Samuelson and Solow’s (1960) original interpretation of the 
policy implications of the Phillips curve.  
  A corollary of this “fooling” characterization is that natural rate theory interprets 
policy as an antagonistic game played between opportunistic policymakers and the public 
rather than a benevolent game between public servants and the public (Barro and Gordon, 
1983b). 
VI Tobin’s neo-Keynesian Phillips curve: the route not taken 
  The Friedman – Phelps - Lucas explanation of the empirical instability of the 
Phillips curve dramatically transformed macroeconomics. However, Tobin (1971a, 
1971b) suggested another approach to explaining the Phillips curve that identified the 
critical issue as incorporation of inflation expectations rather the formation of inflation 
expectations.  
  A simplified version of Tobin’s model is given by the following two equations:  
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 (3.1) w = f(u – u
*) + λπ
e                               0 < λ < 1,  f’ < 0, f” < 0  
(3.2) π = w 
Substituting (3.2) into (3.1) then yields a short-run Phillips curve given by 
(3.3) π = f(u – u
*) + λπ
e 
Applying the long run equilibrium condition that expected inflation equal actual inflation 
(π
e = π) yields a long-run Phillips curve given by 
(3.4) π = f(u – u
*)/[1 – λ] 
The slope of this long-run Phillips curve is given by dπ/du = f’/[1 – λ] < 0. The long run 
Phillips curve is therefore negatively sloped and there exists a permanent trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment.  
  As with the Friedman – Phelps model, if inflation expectations are formed 
adaptively there is a family of short-run Phillips curves, each indexed by the level of 
inflation expectations. However, there is also a long-run negatively sloped Phillips curve 
that is steeper than the short-run Phillips curve (dπ/du|LR = f’/[1–λ] <  dπ/du|SR = f’ < 0). 
This long-run Phillips curve crosses each short-run Philips curve at the point where actual 
inflation equals expected inflation (π = π
e). 
  One feature is that the long-run negatively sloped Phillips curve holds regardless 
of whether inflations expectations are formed adaptively or rationally. If inflation 
expectations are formed rationally then agents have perfect foresight given the non-
stochastic nature of the model. That means expected inflation equals actual inflation at all 
times (π
e = π) so that agents are always on the long-run Phillips curve (i.e. there is no 
family of short-run Phillips curves and the long- and short-run Phillips curves are one). 
However, despite this, the long-run Phillips curve remains negatively sloped. That shows 
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 that formation of inflation expectations is not the critical question when it comes to the 
Phillips curve.  
  Analytically, the key feature of Tobin’s neo-Keynesian Phillips curve is that the 
coefficient of inflation expectations in equation (3.1) is less than unity (λ < 1). That 
means incorporation of inflation expectations into nominal wage-setting is less than 
complete, and it is this rather than the formation of inflation expectations that is critical 
for the existence of a Phillips trade-off.  
  In this regard, there is a long history of empirical support for the proposition that 
the coefficient of inflation expectations is less than unity. Tobin (1971b, p.26) writes: 
“The most important empirical finding is that α21, the coefficient of feedback of price 
inflation on to wages, is significantly less than one.” That finding has been reaffirmed by 
Brainard and Perry (2000), though they also report that the coefficient is variable. Thus, it 
was low in the 1950s and 1960s, rose in the 1970s, and has since fallen back. 
  This raises the theoretical question of why incorporation of inflation expectations 
is less than unity. The problem is it is hard to construct a justification in an aggregate 
labor market model. That is because according to such a model the labor market 
determines real wages and failure to fully incorporate inflation expectations would 
constitute systematic money illusion. That in turn would erode the real wage over time, 
causing systematic disequilibrium.  
VII Tobin’s multi-sector disequilibrium Phillips curve: explaining less than full 
incorporation of inflation expectations 
11 
   The clue to solving the puzzle why empirical estimates of the Phillips curve show 
less than full incorporation of inflation expectations was suggested by Tobin who argued 
the Phillips curve is the product of a multi-sector phenomenon: 
“The myth of macroeconomics is that relations among aggregates are enlarged analogues 
of relations among corresponding variables for individual households; firms, industries, 
markets. That myth is a harmless and useful simplification in many contexts, but 
sometimes it misses the essence of the phenomenon.” (Tobin, 1972, re-printed 1975, 
p.45) 
 
For Tobin, the Phillips curve is a disequilibrium phenomenon, the product of the 
combination of downward nominal wage rigidity plus persistent recurring disequilibria at 
the sector level. Disequilibria are always arising at the sector level and some sectors have 
unemployment because of downward nominal wage rigidity. Greater aggregate demand 
pressure reduces unemployment by reducing the proportion of sectors with 
unemployment, but it raises inflation in sectors at full employment.  
  A multi-sector disequilibrium approach suggests why macroeconomic policy may 
lower unemployment in a welfare improving way, thereby countering the Friedman – 
Phelps – Lucas “fooling” argument. Unfortunately, Tobin (1972) articulated the 
theoretical argument in terms of a multi-sector economy with downward nominal wage 
rigidity rather than a multi-sector economy with incomplete incorporation of inflation 
expectations.  
  The logic of the multi-sector Phillips curve is as follows. Slower nominal wage 
increases in sectors below full employment helps them adjust relative to sectors at full 
employment. That slower nominal wage increase is achieved by incomplete incorporation 
of inflation expectations. The reason why workers do not simply lower nominal wages is 
labor exchange is characterized by conflict and moral hazard, which causes workers to 
12 
 resist wage reductions imposed from within the employment relationship for fear that 
firms are trying to cheat them. However, workers are willing to accept some real wage 
reduction imposed from outside the employment relationship via adjustment of the 
general price level since this is beyond the control of individual firms. Furthermore, 
workers are often nominal debtors (due to mortgage obligations, etc) and that provides 
another reason to resist nominal wage reduction.
5 
  Palley (1994, 1997) provides a formal multi-sector model that incorporates such 
wage setting behavior, and the result is an economy with a negatively sloped long-run 
Phillips curve in which there is a permanent trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment.
6 Where the economy settles on that Phillips curve is determined by the 
rate of aggregate nominal demand growth that determines the equilibrium rate of 
inflation.  
  This multi-sector approach to the Phillips curve can be captured by the following 
simple model. There are N identically sized sectors and nominal wage adjustment at the 
sector level is given by 
                   f(ui – u
*) + λπ
e                     ui > u
*,  0 < λ < 1,  
(4.1) wi =                                                 
                   f(ui – u
*) + π
e                       ui < u
* 
 
where i = 1,…, N and u
* = full employment rate of unemployment. The critical 
innovation is that nominal wage adjustment in sectors with less than full employment 
only partially incorporates inflation expectations. Less than full incorporation helps 
restore full employment but it is accomplished without recourse to nominal wage cuts 
                                                 
5 The microeconomic foundations for such labor market behavior are developed in Palley (1990).  
Bewley (1999) provides empirical evidence that is supportive of this microeconomic logic. 
6 Akerlof et al. (1996) have also developed a model of a negatively sloped long-run Phillips curve. 
However, they emphasize firm heterogeneity and overlook inflation expectations.  
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 from within the employment relation that are resisted by workers for fear of opportunism 
by firms. 
  Workers have rational expectations so that  
(4.2) π = π
e.  
Sector price inflation and aggregate nominal wage and price inflation are given 
respectively by 
(4.3) πi = wi  
(4.4) w = Σwi/N 
(4.5) π = Σπi/N  
Aggregate unemployment and the proportion of sectors with unemployment are given 
respectively by 
(4.6) u = Σui/N  
(4.7) s = s(u)                       0 < s < 1, s’ > 0 
s = proportion of sectors below full-employment. Equation (4.7) embodies the implicit 
assumption that there is a positive monotonic relationship between the aggregate 
unemployment rate and the proportion of sectors below full employment 
  When this pattern of sector wage adjustment is aggregated it yields wage and 
price inflation Phillips curves of the form 
(4.8) w = [1 – s(u)]f(u
- – u*) + s(u)f(u
+ – u*) + [1 – s(u) + s(u)λ]π
e                        
u
- = unemployment rate in sectors above full employment, u
+ = unemployment rate in 
sectors below full employment. The price inflation equation is then given by  
(4.9) π = F(u – u*)/s(u)[1 – λ]                                   Fu < 0 
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 The function F(.) defines the weighted average sector disequilibrium component of 
nominal wage inflation which is given by 
(4.10) F(u – u*) = [1 – s(u)]f(u
- – u*) + s(u)f(u
+ – u*) 
  The aggregate coefficient of inflation expectations in equation (4.8) can be 
defined as 
(4.11) Λ = 1 – s(u) + s(u)λ < 1                                 Λu < 0 
It is a weighted average of incorporation of inflation expectations by sectors at full 
employment and those below full employment. It is less than unity as long as there are 
some sectors below full employment, which holds as long as s(u) > 0. Differentiating 
with respect to u yields 
dΛ/du = [λ -1]su < 0  
The aggregate coefficient for incorporation of inflation expectations therefore falls as 
unemployment rises. The logic is simple. As more sectors experience unemployment they 
hold back on fully incorporating inflation expectations in nominal wage demands, 
lowering the aggregate coefficient.   
  Differentiating equation (4.9) with respect to the unemployment rate yields the 
slope of the Phillips curve which is given by  
(4.9) π = F(u – u*)/s(u)[1 – λ]  
dπ/du = {s(u)F’ - F(u – u*)su}/{s(u)
2[1 – λ]} < 0 
The slope of the Phillips curve is therefore negative so that there is a permanent trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment. As u falls s(u) tends to zero so that the slope 
eventually becomes infinite and the Phillips curve becomes vertical. That corresponds to 
a situation when all sectors are at or beyond full employment. 
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   The key variable is the aggregate coefficient of inflation expectations, Λ, which is 
a weighted average of the sector coefficients of inflation expectations. The aggregate is 
less than unity because sectors with unemployment do not fully incorporate expected 
inflation in their nominal wage settlements. As the unemployment rate and proportion of 
sectors with unemployment decreases, the aggregate coefficient of inflation expectations 
increases. When all sectors are at full-employment it becomes unity. At that stage the 
Phillips curve becomes vertical and the inflation-unemployment trade-off disappears. 
  The multi-sector framework is essential as this structure explains why the 
aggregate coefficient of inflation expectations is less than unity and why it can vary with 
the aggregate unemployment rate. The Phillips curve steepens and the marginal inflation 
– unemployment trade-off weakens as more and more sectors reach full employment and 
fully incorporate inflation expectations. 
  The method of formation of inflation expectations is secondary. In the above 
model workers are assumed to have perfect foresight (i.e. rational expectations) and a 
Phillips trade-off still exists. Having adaptive expectations would not change this. The 
only effect would be to create a separate additional family of short run Phillips curve, 
each indexed by the level of inflation expectations, that intersect the long-run Phillips 
curve at the point where π
e = π. 
VIII The backward bending Phillips curve: near-rational expectations 
  The Phillips curve has historically been viewed as negatively sloped. Akerlof, 
Dickens, and Schultz (2000) have presented a model which has the Phillips curve 
bending backward. According to their model, the curve is initially negatively sloped in 
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 unemployment – inflation space, then bends back and becomes positively sloped, and 
ultimately becomes vertical.   
  Such a backward bending Phillips curve is shown in Figure 1. In place of a non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) that acts as a constraint on the 
sustainable minimum unemployment rate, there is a minimum unemployment rate 
(MUR) that pairs with a minimum unemployment rate of inflation (MURI). The MURI is 
the inflation rate that obtains at the point of inflexion when the Phillips curve bends 
backward. 










Whereas Tobin (1972) proposed a multi-sector approach to the Phillips curve, 
Akerlof et al. (2000) adopt a multi-agent approach in which agents differ in their degree 
of rationality. That approach makes formation of inflation expectations the foundation of 
the Phillips trade-off and therefore remains stuck in the Friedman-Phelps-Lucas research 
tradition.  
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 The argument is some agents (workers) have near-rational inflation expectations 
and they systematically under-estimate inflation at low rates of inflation. This constitutes 
a form of “money illusion”, and it is this money illusion that enables a trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment. However, as actual inflation increases workers 
progressively reduce the extent of money illusion (i.e. reduce their underestimate of 
actual inflation). That reversal causes the Phillips curve to bend back and eventually 
become vertical at high levels of inflation when workers fully correct their underestimate. 
The model can represented in a conventional Phillips curve framework by the 
following equations: 
                   f(u – u
*) + π
e
R                       i = R 
 (5.1) wi =                                                 
                   f(u – u
*) + π
e




R = π                                      
                 = p(π) < π                              π < π




                  = π                                        π > π
C   
 
(5.4) πi = wi  
(5.5) w = swNR + [1 – s]wR 
(5.6) π = sπNR + [1 – s]πR  
(5.7) s = s(π)                                            0 < s < 1, s’ < 0 
  The critical feature of the model is there are two types of agents – rational (R) and 
near-rational (NR). Rational agents have perfect foresight rational expectations and their 
expected inflation equals actual inflation, as described by equation (5.2). Near-rational 
agents have near rational expectations and consistently under-estimate inflation when 
inflation is low. Equation (5.3) describes the determination of their inflation expectations. 
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 NR agents underestimate inflation when it is less than π
C, though the error also falls as 
inflation rises. They correctly estimate inflation when it is at or above π
C.  
  Equation (5.7) describes the proportion of NR agents in the economy. As inflation 
rises, the proportion falls as more and more agents become aware of their underestimate. 
  Combining equations (5.2), (5.3) and (5.7) yields an expression for economy-wide 




NR + [1 – s(π)]π
e
R 
Combining (5.8) with (5.1) and (5.7) then yields an aggregate equation for the Phillips 
curve given by 
(5.9) π = f(u – u
*) + s(π)π
e
NR + [1 – s(π)]π
e
R 
  There are now two regimes: one where inflation is equal to or greater than π
C and 
the proportion of NR agents has shrunk to zero; the other where inflation is below π
C and 
the proportion of NR agents is non-zero.  
  In the regime where π > π
C all agents are rational and the Phillips curve is given 
by 




e = π  
The Phillips curve therefore reduces to the natural rate vertical Phillips curve and there is 
no trade-off. 
  In the regime where π < π
C some agents are non-rational and the Phillips curve is 
given by 
(5.11) π = f(u – u
*) + s(π)p(π) + [1 – s(π)]π 
Differentiating with respect to u yields 
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 dπ/du = f’/[ s(π) + πs’ – s’p(π) – p’s(π)]  
>
< 0 
The sign of this expression is ambiguous and depends on the rate of inflation. The 
numerator is negative, but the denominator is ambiguous. When π is low, s(π) is large 
and the denominator will be positive if it dominates, making the Phillips curve negatively 
sloped. As inflation increases s(π) falls and the term involving π gains greater weight, 
causing the expression to change sign so that the denominator becomes negative and the 
Phillips curve bends back. 
  The economic logic of the Akerlof et al. (2000) backward bending Phillips curve 
is as follows. Initially, higher inflation lowers unemployment by fooling NR agents. 
However, as inflation increases, fewer and fewer agents are “fooled” by inflation. 
Additionally, those who are fooled are fooled by less. These effects contribute to making 
the Phillips curve steeper (i.e. the marginal effect of inflation fooling diminishes). 
Eventually, as the proportion of NR agents shrinks, further increasing inflation actually 
increases unemployment by further reducing the number of NR agents and lowering the 
extent to which remaining NR agents are fooled. 
IX The backward bending Phillips curve with incomplete incorporation of inflation 
expectations. 
  Akerlof et al. (2000) redirect attention back to the issue of formation of inflation 
expectations and generate a Phillips curve because some workers systematically 
underestimate inflation. Palley (2003) provides an alternative explanation of the 
backward bending Phillips that rests on a multi-sector construction of the economy in 
which there is less than complete incorporation of inflation expectations in sectors with 
unemployment.  
20 
   The key innovation is that workers in sectors with unemployment become 
increasingly resistant to excessively fast reductions in the general purchasing power of 
their wages. They therefore respond to increased inflation by increasing the extent of 
incorporation of inflation expectations. Such a mechanism was suggested by Rowthorn 
(1977), albeit in the context of a single sector economy. 
  The model is the same as that in section VII and described by equations (4.1) – 
(4.7). As before, there are two sector nominal wage adjustment regimes. One when a 
sector is below full employment (ui > u
*), and another when a sector is at or above full 
employment (ui > u
*). However, there is an additional equation determining the 
coefficient of inflation expectations in sectors with unemployment, given by: 
                 λ(π
e) < 1                  π
e < π
C, λ’ > 0 
(6.1) λ =  




This coefficient depends on the rate of inflation. In low inflation environments there is 
less than full incorporation of inflation expectations. However, as inflation increases the 




   There are now two regimes to consider. Regime one is when all sectors are at full 
employment so that proportion of sectors with unemployment is zero and s(u) = 0. 
Regime two is when some sectors have unemployment and s(u) > 0. 
  When all sectors are at full employment (regime one) the coefficient of inflation 
expectations is unity in all sectors. In this case the aggregate Phillips curve is given by: 
(6.2) π = F(u – u*) + π




e = π                                            
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 This is the same as the natural rate vertical Phillips curve and there is no inflation – 
unemployment trade-off, 
  When some sectors have unemployment (regime two) the aggregate Phillips curve 
is given by: 
(6.4) π = F(u – u*) + [1 – s(u)]π
e + s(u)λ(π
e)π




e = π                                                                          
The critical feature is that as long as π
e < π
C the aggregate coefficient of inflation 
expectations will be less than unity because workers in sectors with unemployment less 
than fully incorporate inflation expectations.  
  Substituting (6.5) into (6.4) and differentiating with respect to u yields the slope 
of the Phillips curve, which is given by 
dπ/du = {F’ + s’π[λ(π) – 1]}/s(u){[1 - λ(π)] - πλ’} 
>
< 0 
The sign of this expression is ambiguous. The denominator is negative, but the numerator 
is ambiguous. For low rates of inflation, λ(π) will be small so that the numerator is 
positive and the slope of the Phillips curve is negative. However, as inflation increases, 
λ(π) increases so that the numerator becomes negative and the Phillips bends back and 
become positively sloped.  
  The economic logic is that when inflation is low sectors with unemployment do 
not fully incorporate aggregate inflation in their wage demands, enabling an increase in 
real demand that lowers unemployment in those sectors and in aggregate. However, as 
inflation increases, workers in these sectors start increasingly resisting too rapid real 
wage erosion. That diminishes the beneficial effect of inflation, causing the Phillips curve 
to steepen. As inflation increases further the Phillips curve bends back because workers 
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 start to ratchet up their incorporation of inflation expectations faster than the increase in 
inflation. 
  For low inflation rates there is an unemployment trade-off, but once again it has 
nothing to do with formation of expectations, misperceptions, or fooling. Workers have 
perfect foresight but choose not to fully incorporate their inflation expectations.  
  Replacing perfect foresight with adaptive expectations would complicate the 
model. Instead of a single backward bending Phillips curve that is both the short-run and 
long-run Phillips curve, there would be a long-run Phillips curve and a family of short-
run Phillips curves each indexed by a particular level of adaptive expectations. As 
inflation expectations increase, each short-run Phillips curve will become steeper because 
the coefficient of feedback of inflation expectations, λ(π
e), becomes larger in equation 
(6.4). Each individual short-run Phillips curve is also convex because of the F(u – u*) and 
s(u) terms in equation (6.4). This is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. The backward bending Phillips curve (LRPC) with 














   Such a configuration helps explain the econometric difficulties surrounding the 
Phillips curve. A single backward bending Phillips curve that becomes vertical will on its 
own produce a complicated scatter plot. A backward bending Phillips curves that is 
crossed by a family of short-run Phillips curves will produce a scatter plot that is bunched 
and looks close to random. That makes it enormously difficult to estimate 
econometrically the Phillips curve. 
X Worker militancy, conflict, and the Phillips curve 
In the above model the slope of the backward bending Phillips curve and its 
turning point depend on how rapidly workers start to display real wage resistance (i.e 
how sensitive λ is to π
e). If workers start displaying real wage resistance at low inflation 
rates, the Phillips curve will be steep and bend back at a relatively low rate of inflation 
and high rate of unemployment. If real wage resistance only develops slowly, the Phillips 
curve will be flatter and will bend back at a higher rate of inflation and lower rate of 
unemployment.
7  
This links the Phillips curve to Post Keynesian concerns with the inflation effects 
of labor market conflict and worker militancy. It also closes a hole in Post Keynesian 
conflict inflation theory which has no theory of how inflation expectations fit into the 
Phillips curve.
8  
                                                 
7 The model presented in this section is based on Palley (2009). 
8 Indeed, if inflation expectations are introduced in the standard Post Keynesian model (Myatt, 
1986; Dalziel, 1991; Lavoie, 1992; Palley, 1996) and workers correctly anticipate inflation, the 
Post Keynesian Phillips curve is vertical for the same reason the neo-Keynesian Phillips curve 
(Tobin 1971a, 1971b) was vertical, unless the feedback of inflation expectations is less than unity. 
That begs the question addressed in this paper.  
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 Worker militancy can be thought of as a political attitude that influences wage 
behavior. Such a militancy effect can be incorporated by re-specifying the sector nominal 
wage adjustment process as follows 
                   f(ui – u
*) + λπ
e                     ui > u
*,  0 < λ < 1,  
(7.1) wi =                                                 
                   f(ui – u
*) + π
e                       ui < u
* 
 
(7.2) π = π
e  
(7.3) u
* = u(ψ)                                   uψ > 0     
                 λ(π
e, ψ) < 1                       π
e < π
C, λπe > 0, λψ > 0  
(7.4) λ =  




where ψ = labor militancy variable. The model is identical to that described in section IX 
except for the addition of a labor militancy variable. 
  Labor militancy affects the inflation process in two ways. First, equation (7.3) has 
labor militancy raising the unemployment rate at which workers start to demand higher 
wages. Greater militancy means unemployment has less of an intimidation effect on wage 
demands so that wage inflation picks up at a higher rate of unemployment. 
Second, equation (7.4) has an increase in labor militancy raise the coefficient of 
inflation expectations, thereby increasing the incorporation of inflation expectations for 
any given rate of expected inflation. That means nominal wage inflation incorporates 
more expected inflation. 
Using equations (7.1) – (7.4) and equations (4.3) – (4.7) yields the following 
aggregate nominal wage Phillips curve  
              = F(u – u*(ψ)) + [1 – s(u) + s(u)λ(π
e, ψ)]π
e                       π
e < π
C 
 (7.5) w  
              = F(u – u*(ψ)) + π





 The price inflation Phillips curve is then given by 
(7.6) π = F(u – u*(ψ))/s(u)[1 – λ(π




Like the Phillips curve in section IX, this Phillips curve is backward bending. Likewise, 
when π
e > π
C the Phillips curve is vertical. 
  Figure 3 shows the effect of increased worker militancy on the Phillips curve. 
Greater worker militancy causes a generalized rightward shift of the Phillips curve by 
increasing the unemployment rate consistent with zero inflation. Additionally, it 
generates more rapid feedback of inflation expectations that causes the Phillips curve to 
bend back at lower rates of inflation and higher rates of unemployment. Greater militancy 
therefore lowers the minimum unemployment rate of inflation (MURI1 > MURI2). The 
reverse holds for reduced militancy. 
Figure 3. Increased worker militancy shifts the backward 








This formulation has important policy consequences. It is widely believed 
that the current era is one of reduced labor militancy. Indeed, as far back as 1999 
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 former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan (1999) openly commented 
about workers’ heightened sense of job insecurity tamping down real wages. In 
terms of the above model, this can be interpreted as reduced militancy that has 
shifted the Phillips curve left and increased the MURI, creating space for the 
monetary authority to push for a lower rate of unemployment.  
XI Near-rational expectations versus incomplete incorporation of expectations: why 
it matters  
  Near-rational expectations (Akerlof et al., 1996, 2000) and incomplete 
incorporation of inflation expectations (Palley, 1994, 1997, 2003) can both explain the 
Phillips curve and why it might also be backward-bending. However, the two theories 
have dramatically different economic welfare implications, and they also have different 
empirical implications. 
  With regard to economic welfare implications, the critical feature is that the near-
rationality approach relies on misperceptions and fooling to generate a Phillips trade-off. 
As in the Friedman (1968) – Phelps (1968) – Lucas–Rapping (1969) world, near-
rationality has workers being fooled to supply more labor. At low rates of inflation, near-
rational workers systematically under-estimate inflation and they therefore supply more 
labor than they would if they had full information or rational expectations. Such fooling 
is sub-optimal from a welfare standpoint since it forces a departure from the full 
information equilibrium. Consequently, the policy recommendation from a model that 
generates a Phillips trade-off on the basis of near-rationality is to either have zero 
inflation or an inflation rate above π
C at which rate all agents are rational and correctly 
anticipate inflation.  
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   In contrast, the nominal wage conflict approach involves no fooling. Instead, 
inflation helps circumvent mistrust between workers and firms over adjusting wages from 
within the employment relation. It does so by imposing wage adjustments from outside 
the relation via the general price level. That helps reduce disequilibrium unemployment 
and it unambiguously raises economic welfare by avoiding wasteful unemployment. That 
was Tobin’s (1972) original rationale for why a little bit of inflation could increase 
economic welfare by greasing the wheels of labor market adjustment. 
  Which theory is to be preferred? There are both theoretical and empirical reasons 
to prefer the incomplete incorporation of inflation expectations hypothesis. With regard 
to theory, the near-rational expectations approach relies on some workers having near-
rational expectations. Who are those workers, and why are only some near rational. In 
less polite language, who are the fools and why do they not learn? The incomplete 
incorporation of inflation expectations approach views the nominal wage adjustment 
problem as generic and afflicting all sectors and workers. However, at any particular time 
only those sectors with unemployment are affected by it. 
  With regard to empirics, the near-rationality approach predicts that, at low rates of 
inflation, surveys of inflation expectations obtained from randomly selected participants 
should be systematically below actual inflation and rationally formed inflation 
expectations. This is because the pool of respondents will include a mix of near-rational 
and rational agents, and the former systematically under-estimate inflation. The inflation 
expectations incorporation hypothesis implies no such bias about the public’s inflation 
expectations.  
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   Second, in contrast to the near-rational expectations hypothesis, the inflation 
expectations incorporation hypothesis provides a theoretical explanation of Brainard and 
Perry’s (2000) finding that the coefficient of inflation expectations increased in the 
1970s. One reason is that workers may have become more militant. A second reason is 
that the economy may have been operating on the positively sloped portion of the 
backward bending Phillips curve. In that region, high inflation prompts workers to resist 
too rapid real wage erosion by incorporating more of their inflation expectations into 
nominal wage setting. 
XI Conclusion 
  The Phillips curve is an essential part of macroeconomics, yet its history has been 
one of initial theoretical confusion followed by subsequent neglect of alternative 
theoretical explanations. The Friedman – Phelps – Lucas explanation of the Phillips curve 
fundamentally changed the direction of Phillips curve research, making formation of 
inflation expectations the critical question. That change truncated interest in an 
alternative approach to explaining the Phillips curve that identified incorporation of 
inflation expectations into nominal wage setting as the critical factor.   
  Forty years on, macroeconomics remains dominated by the issue of formation of 
expectations and there seems little awareness of the significance of expectation 
incorporation. Near-rational expectation formation can explain the existence of a 
negatively sloped Phillips curve, but it cannot provide a welfare economics rationale for 
exploiting the trade-off. That keeps macroeconomic policy stuck in the policy orbit of 
natural rate thinking. In contrast, explaining the Phillips curve by reference to rational but 
incomplete incorporation of inflation expectations breaks that orbit and provides a 
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 rationale for Keynesian activist policies that reduce unemployment at the cost of higher 
inflation. 
  Academic research is path dependent, and once a particular path is chosen it is 
difficult to reconsider paths not taken. In the case of Phillips curve research that has had 
enormous implications for macroeconomics and macroeconomic policy because of the 
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